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Abstract

The Australian tax reform in July 2000 gave heavier weights to
consumption tax in the tax mix at the expense of the income tax. This paper
shows that the trade off among the tax-mix policy parameters depends on
the structure of the economy. Given that the reform is tax-revenue neutral
and no change in monetary stance, a rise in the share of consumption tax in
the tax mix may increase the effectiveness of government spending in
stabilising the economy if certain contain is fulfilled. A numerical example
is included for illustration purpose.
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1.

Introduction

In the 1998 Federal election, the Coalition Government campaigned for re-election on
the platform of a tax reform. The Coalition Government argued that the tax system then was
outdated, complex, unfair, ineffective, penalising exports, and discouraging investment. All
these problems could only be fixed once and for all by reforming the tax system. The
centrepiece of its tax reform was to replace the wholesale sale taxes of six different rates, the
financial institution duties, the debit tax, the conveyancing duties on business property, and
five other stamp duties with a Goods and Services Tax (GST)—a credit value-added-tax
(VAT) type of general consumption tax. To squash any speculation that the tax reform was a
revenue-raising exercise, the Coalition Government (Commonwealth Government, 1998,
p.10) stated that “The tax reform plan . . . is not aimed at additional revenue”. The additional
revenue from the GST would be used to fund an increase in the income tax threshold, a
reduction in the marginal income tax rates, and a one-off increase in certain welfare
payments. The Coalition Government also ensured that the impact of the tax reform would be
tax-revenue neutral for the States, Territories and Local governments for the three-year
transition period (Commonwealth Government, 1998, p.104 and p.155). The Coalition won
the re-election and the rest was history.1

Theoretically, a general consumption tax should apply to all goods and services. For
qualified welfare recipients, they can be reimbursed by further transfer payments. However,
the compliance costs on the part of the retailers and the administration costs on the part of the
government agency (CentreLink) of such a reimbursement scheme may be quite substantial,
not to mention the issue of privacy. The outcome of the political process predictably
produces a second-best solution: The Australian GST has exemption or zero rating on food,
health, education, childcare services, hospitals and nursing homes, local government rates,
water and sewerage charges, and charitable activities.2 Readers who are interested in the
issue of regressivity or a lack of progressivity of consumption tax can refer to Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1987), Metcalf (1995), Krusell et al. (1996), and Creedy (1998, 2002). Interestingly,
Freebairn (1999) found that the revised tax reform package did not make the post-reform tax
system any more regressive than the pre-reform tax system.
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This paper takes the discussion to a different direction.3 It examines a possible
relationship between tax mix and effectiveness of government spending. Tax mix refers to
the composition of total tax revenue from various sources of taxes, summarised by four taxmix policy parameters: income tax rate, consumption tax rate, household income-tax free
threshold, and consumption tax exemption proportion. In the recent tax reform, the change in
the tax mix involved an increase in the share of the consumption tax in the total tax revenue.
The question this paper would like to ask is: Whether such a change would impact on the
effectiveness of government spending? This is a concern for economic policy makers
especially those whose countries have adopted inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates.
As far as the author is aware, the relationship between revenue-neutral tax mix and
effectiveness of government spending, both belong to the realm of fiscal policy, has not been
investigated in the economic literature. The author finds the IS-LM model, though
rudimentary in nature and not without pitfalls, is capable to shed light on this issue, which
makes the results more accessible to a wider audience.4 There are two findings in this paper.
First, the effectiveness of government spending affecting output depends on a rather
complicated condition depending on the structure of the economy and the four tax-mix policy
parameters. Second, the six trade-off ratios among the four tax-mix policy parameters,
including that of income and consumption tax rates, remain constant as long as the rest of the
parameters in the model remain constant. Since there is a lack of Australian data to date to
carry out any meaningful empirical study, the author resorts to a simple numerical example to
illustrate his point.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a three-sector ISLM model with both income and consumption taxes. Section 3 discusses the trade off among
the various tax-mix policy parameters. Section 4 examines the impact of tax mix in particular
an increase in the share of consumption tax on the effectiveness of government spending.
Section 5 presents a numerical example. Section 6 is the conclusion.

2.

A Simple Three-Sector IS-LM Model with Dual Taxes

This section presents a typical IS-LM model for a closed economy, which forms the
basis of the discussion. The linear forms of the consumption function, the investment
function, and the money demand function are specified as
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C = C o + cY D

(1)

I = Io − h r

(2)

d

⎛M ⎞
d
⎜ ⎟ = m = f Y − kr
⎝ P⎠

(3)

where C is consumption, C o is baseline consumption, c is marginal propensity to consume,

Y D is disposal (real) income, I is investment, I o is baseline investment, h is interest sensitivity
of investment, r is real interest rate, ( M / P) d or m d is demand for real balances, f is income

sensitivity of demand for money, and k is interest sensitivity of demand for money.

There are two ways of modelling consumption tax depending on whether retail prices of
goods and services are tax exclusive or inclusive. In case where the consumption tax is added
onto the retail price, the prices are said to be tax exclusive. In case where the consumption tax
is a VAT-type and the prices include the consumption tax (e.g., the GST), then the
consumption tax is said to be tax inclusive. For convenience, the same tax revenue function
for both versions of the consumption tax is written as:
T (C ) = v C

(4)

where T is the tax revenue and v is consumption tax rate. When prices are tax exclusive, v = z
and z is the ad valorem tax rate. When prices are tax inclusive as in the case of the GST,
v = z (1 + z ) .

In reality, goods and services may be classified into different categories and rated
differently, then, equation (4) becomes T (C ) = ∑ vi C i . The simplest version of this
complicated scheme is to divide all goods and services into two categories: Essentials with
zero rating and non-essentials with positive rating.5 A roundabout way to present this
dichotomous scheme is to introduce a consumption tax exemption proportion 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 to
approximate the part of zero-rated essential consumption. Consequently, the tax revenue
from consumption tax is

T (C ) = v(1 − b) C

(5)

As for the income tax, this paper follows the approach by Creedy (1998) to capture the
progressivity nature of most income-tax systems. Each household has an income-tax free
threshold 0 < a . With N households in the economy the amount of income exempted from
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income tax is 0 < a N < Y . Putting the income tax revenue and consumption tax revenue
together, the tax equation becomes

T = t (Y − a N ) + v(1 − b) C

(6)

and t, v, a, and b are the four tax-mix policy parameters (hereafter policy parameters); their
relationship to be examined in Section 3.

The solution of the model is complicated by the presence of the GST. Household
consumption depends on the level of disposable income but the latter also depends on how
much the households consume. This interdependence introduces a geometric series into the
consumption equation
C=

C o + a N c t − c (1 − t ) Y

β

(7)

and the dual-tax IS curve
r=

( I o + Go ) β + C o + a N c t ⎡ β −c (1 − t ) ⎤
−⎢
⎥Y
hβ
hβ
⎣
⎦

(8)

where β = 1 + c v (1 − b) . Without further ado, the equation of the LM curve is
r=−

m0
f
+ Y where m0 stands for real money balances. And the equilibrium value for real
k
k

GDPY is:
Y* =

3.

β (m0 h + k I o + k Go ) + k C o + k a N c t
.
β ( f h + k ) − k c (1 − t )

(9)

Trade Off Among Tax-Mix Policy Parameters

It is reasonable to argue that a new tax regime is at least tax revenue neutral or tax
revenue enhancing in its inceptive year for the government to fulfil its financial commitments.
It is more likely to be tax neutral to avoid the accusation of revenue grabbing. This is exactly
what the Coalition Government pledged when it campaigned for its tax reform. Another
reason that the government may prefer to maintain neutrality is that a depletion or
enhancement may create an economic shock that the government has to handle on top of the
administrative problems of changing the tax system. The immediate question is: What is the
implication of tax neutrality in the context of this simple IS-LM model. As long as tax
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revenue does not change, real GDP remains at the same level in the short run when prices are
rigid. Since both consumption and saving are functions of disposal income, which in turn
depends on tax given real GDP, a stable tax liability means stable consumption and saving,
ceteris paribus. That is, tax revenue neutrality implies real-GDP neutrality.

The six trade-off ratios among the four policy-parameters—t, v, a, and b—is crucial to
the study of the effectiveness of government spending. To obtain the equation for deriving
the trade-off ratio, substitute the consumption equation (7) into the tax equation (6) and total
differentiate, further setting dT = dY = dC o = dc = dN = 0 , yields
0 = β (Y − a N ) dt − β t N da + (1 − b) B dv − v B db

(10)

where B = C o + c (1 − t ) Y + a N c t . Equation (10) describes the trade off among the tax-mix
policy parameters under the condition of tax-revenue and real-GDP neutrality. The Australian
tax reform represents a decrease in the exemption rate b and the adoption of a common
consumption tax rate v for all categories of goods and services with a simultaneous decrease
in income tax rate t and income tax-free threshold a. As a result, there is an increase in the
share of consumption tax in the tax revenue with the increase to fund an increase in income
tax threshold and lowering of marginal income tax rate. As for the issue of tax-revenue
neutrality of Australian tax reform, recent statistics do show that the tax composition has not
changed substantially; see Table 1. The percentage of the tax involved in the tax reform in
terms of the total tax revenue has been steadily increasing over time irrespective of the
occurrence of the tax reform. The sudden drop in the introductory year of the GST is likely to
be the result of a drop in consumption due to the psychological impact of an imposition of a

Table 1: Tax Revenue Trade Off

Fiscal year
Personal income tax
Sales tax
Goods & services taxes (GST)
Total tax revenue
Personal income tax as a percentage
of total tax revenue
Sales tax/GST as a percentage of
total tax revenue
The three tax as a percentage of total
tax revenue

Tax revenue for all levels of government (in $m)
98-99
99-00
00-01
01-02
02-03
76,736
84,986
78,634
88,388
92,582
15,215
15,644
1,976
791
896
23,854
27,389
31,257
181,498 196,390 213,997 217,239 227,668
42.28%

43.27%

36.75%

40.69%

40.67%

8.38%

7.97%

12.07%

12.97%

14.12%

50.66%

51.24%

48.82%

53.66%

54.79%
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new tax. The percentage of the personal income tax and sales tax/GST has actually increased
over the period from 40% to 44%, which can be an indicator that the tax reform is not revenue
neutral.

3.1

Trade-off Ratio for Income and Consumption Tax

Creedy (1998) suggested that the trade off between income and consumption tax rate is
a function of the two tax rates, the income tax free threshold, and the arithmetic mean income.
This sub-section addresses the same issue within the IS-LM framework. The tax-rate tradeoff ratio for income and consumption tax α vt is obtained by setting the changes in the income
tax-free threshold a and consumption tax exemption proportion b equal zero in equation (10),
which gives

α vt =

β (Y − a N )
dv
=−
<0
dt T
B (1 − b)

(11)

which turn out to be a function of the four tax-policy parameters, real GDP, numbers of
households, marginal propensity to consume, and baseline consumption. The IS-LM
framework employed here is able to give a more comprehensive picture of the determinants of
the tax-rate trade-off ratio than Creedy (1998). By replacing the arithmetic mean income by
real GDP, the latter can be further expanded using equation (9), which yields

α vt = −

[1 + c v (1 − b)] (a N f h + a N k − m0 h − k I o − k Go ) − a N k c
[1 + c v (1 − b)] c (1 − b) (m0 h + k I o + k Go ) + a N k c 2 t (1 − b)

<0

(12)

where the value of the tax-rate trade-off ratio is now determined by all the parameters in the
economy. Additional comparative static analysis on equation (12) produces equation (13)
which summaries the effect of a change in each parameter on the tax-rate trade-off ratio.
+ +

+

+

+

−

+

+ + + −

α vt = f ( a, b, C o , I o , G o , M 0 , P0 , c, h, f , k )

(13)

There are five observations about the tax-rate trade-off ratio. Firstly, it is negative because
consumption tax has a narrower tax base than income tax. Suppose there is a cut in the
income tax by ∆t < 0 , the first round increase in disposable income is ∆Y D = − Y ∆t > 0 .

This increase in disposable income is allocated to consumption and saving (or future
consumption). To maintain revenue neutrality, that is, −Y ∆t = C ∆v , − ∆t < ∆v must hold.
Secondly, the “+” or “ – “ sign in equation (13) indicates a smaller or larger trade off between
the two tax rates when there are changes in the values of other parameters. And the tax-rate
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trade-off ratio is constant as long as the rest of the structure of the economy remains
unchanged. Thirdly, except increases in money stock (nominal or real) and interest sensitivity
of demand for money, increases in all parameters increase the trade off between the two tax
rates. Fourthly, the trade off is also affected by the economic condition; any increase
(decrease) in baseline or autonomous expenditure in an era of economic upswing
(downswing) increases (decreases) the value of α vt . Lastly, the approach used here are not
able to throw light on the issue of the regressive nature of consumption tax.

3.2

Other Pair-wise Trade-off Ratios

The same procedure is applied to obtain the other pair-wise trade-off ratios:

α ta =

tN
dt
=
>0
da T (Y − a N )

(14)

α vb =

dv
v
=
>0
db T (1 − b)

(15)

α va =

dv
da

=
T

βtN
B (1 − b)

>0

(16)

α tb =

dt
vB
=
>0
db T β (Y − a N )

(17)

α ba =

βtN
db
=−
<0
da T
vB

(18)

These trade-off ratios describe the trade off between any pair of tax-mix policy parameters
with revenue neutrality. For example, the trade-off ratio α ta describes the trade off between
the income tax rate and the tax-free threshold to maintain constant income tax revenue; a
higher tax-free threshold rate is compensated by a higher income tax rate. Similarly, a higher
consumption tax exemption proportion has to be compensated by a higher consumption tax
rate as illustrated by equation (15). After expanding Y, B, and β on the right-hand-side of
equations (14) – (18), the various trade-off ratios can be expressed as functions of those
parameters on the left-hand-side of equation (13). This operation is not performed here
because it does not affect the discussion of the relationship between tax mix and effectiveness
of government spending. Further, a numerical example is provided in Section 5 to help
readers to visualise the magnitude of these pair-wise trade-off ratios.
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4.

Tax Mix and the Effectiveness of Government Spending

The examination of the impact of a shift in the tax mix from income tax to consumption
tax on the effectiveness of government spending in stabilising the economy is of particular
interest. It is argued by many economists that the ability of fiscal policy to influence output is
largely militated against by (a) a inflation-targeting monetary regime (to provide a viable
environment for economic growth), (b) the adoption of flexible exchange rate, and (c)
increasing capital mobility across national boarders.6 If an increase in the share of the general
consumption tax in the tax mix may favourably affect the government ability to stabilise the
economy, it adds to the argument from the government viewpoint for an increased share of
the general consumption tax or a fundamental tax reform of replacing the income tax with a
general consumption tax.

To facilitate the discussion here, the assumption of no change in monetary stance is
retained. Differentiate equation (9) with respect to Go yields the government expenditure
multiplier Φ :
Φ=

βk
∂Y *
=
∂G o β ( f h + k ) − k c (1 − t )

(19)

Note that the household income-tax free threshold a does not affect the size of the multiplier,
which in turn implies it has no impact on the effectiveness of government spending in
stabilising the economy. The impact of a change in the tax mix on the effectiveness of
government spending is examined by varying the values of the three policy-parameters v, t,
and b while maintaining revenue neutrality. Total differentiate equation (19) and set

dc = df = dh = dk = 0 yields
dΦ = −

β k 2c
H2

dt −

k 2 c 2 (1 − b) (1 − t )
H2

dv +

k 2 c 2 v (1 − t )
H2

db

(20)

where H = β ( f h + k ) − k c (1 − t ) . Equation (20) together with the six pair-wise trade-off
ratios underpins the analysis of the impact of a shift in the tax mix on the effectiveness of
government spending.
The scenario where an ∆v accompanied by revenue-neutral changes in ∆t and ∆b is
considered. Applying the definitions of the relevant trade-off ratios and consolidating terms,
equation (20) can be rewritten as
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dΦ = −

k 2c

α vt α vb H 2

{α vb c (1 − b) [α vt (1 − t ) + v] − α vt c v (1 − t ) } dv

(21)

And the condition for effectiveness of government spending is

dΦ
dv T

⎧⎪ > ⎫⎪
⎨ = ⎬ 0 as
⎪⎩ < ⎪⎭

⎧⎪ > ⎫⎪

α vb (1 − b) [α vt (1 − t ) + v] − α vt v (1 − t ) ⎨ = ⎬ 0
⎪⎩ < ⎪⎭

(22)

Condition (22) is too complicated to be explained in any economic meaningful way.7 Further
analysis of condition (22) reveals that the sign of dΦ / dv is indeterminate. Nevertheless, a
positive (negative) value indicates that government spending becomes relatively more (less)
effective in affecting real GDP the higher the share of consumption tax in the tax mix. And
despite its complexity, it gives us the condition of effectiveness of government spending and
may provide an empirical means to shed light on whether Australian tax reform will make the
government spending more effective on influencing the real GDP of the economy.

5.

A Numerical Example

A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet model is constructed to carry out this exercise. Suppose
C o = $10b , c = 0.80 , I o = $400b , h = $400b , f = 0.9 , k = $900b , M 0 = $200b ,
P0 = 120 , G 0 = $200b , a = $6,000 , N = 10m , t = 30%, v = 5%, and b = 30% .8 This set of
numbers represents the baseline for this numerical example. The equilibrium values of the
economy are calculated as: Y = $815.91b, T = $243.16b, Y D =$572.75b, C = $468.20b, public
saving T-G = $43.16b, share of government = 24.51%, r = 0.63%, I = $147.71b, private
saving = $104.55b, national saving rate = 18.10%, income-tax share in total tax revenue =
93.26%, and consumption-tax share in total tax revenue = 6.74%. The tax rate trade off ratio

α vt is – 2.3064, and the other pair-wise trade-off ratios are α va = 0.0092 , α vb = 0.0714 ,
α bt = 32.2900 , α ba = −0.1282 , and α at = 0.4064 . Their interpretations are tabulated in
Table 2.

10
Table 2: Pair-wise Trade-off Ratios

Trade-off
ratio

Value

α vt

-2.3064

α va

0.0092

α vb

0.0714

α bt

32.2900

Tax neutrality trade off
A one percentage point reduction (rise) in income tax rate t requires a
reduction (rise) of 2.3064 percentage point in consumption tax rate v.
A $1000 increase (decrease) in household income-tax free threshold a,
tax neutrality requires a 0.92 percentage point increase (decrease) in
consumption tax rate v.
A one percentage point rise (reduction) in consumption tax exemption
proportion b requires a 0.0714 percentage point rise (reduction) in
consumption tax rate v.
A one percentage point increase (decrease) in income tax rate t
requires a 32.29 percentage point increase (decrease) in consumption
tax exemption proportion b.

The condition of effectiveness for government spending, as represented by equation
(22), turns out to be positive with α vb (1 − b) [α vt (1 − t ) + v] − α vt v (1 − t ) = 0.0025 > 0 . This
value indicates that with respect to this numerical example the effectiveness of government
spending increases as the share of consumption tax in the total tax revenue increases. To
ascertain the validity of this claim, a tax-revenue neutral shift toward consumption tax is
generated by increasing the consumption tax rate from v = 5% to v = 10% and lowering the
exemption proportion from 30% to 10%. Using the Solver program that is embedded in
Microsoft Excel, the income tax rate is calculated to decrease by 3.4066 percentage point to
26.5934 per cent holding tax-free threshold constant. As a result, the consumption tax share
in the total tax revenue has risen from 6.74% to 17.33%. Except the exemption proportionincome tax rate trade-off ratio remains constant, the values of the other pair-wise trade-off
ratios assume new values: α vt = − 1.7939 , α va = 0.6311 , α vb = 0.1111 , α ba = − 5.6799 , and

α at = 0.3518 .
For testing of the relative effectiveness of a change in government spending under
different tax mixes, a target real GDP is set at $856.71b, which is about five per cent above
the baseline equilibrium real GDP of $815.91b. It is found that the larger the share of the
consumption tax in the tax revenue the relatively more effective is the change in government
spending. The results are tabulated in Table 3.
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Table 3: Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy
∆G o

Tax Mix
Consumption tax share in total
tax revenue is 6.74% generated
by t = 30%, v = 5%, and b = 30%
Consumption tax share in total
tax revenue is 17.33% generated
by t = 26.5934%, v = 10%, and b
= 10%

6.

for reaching
target Y = $856.71b

Percentage
change in Go

$34.89b

Increase by
17.45%

$34.77b

Increase by
17.38%

Conclusion

A change in the tax mix involves a change in the composition of the tax revenue from
income and consumption taxes. The Australian tax reform implemented in year 2000 gave
heavier weighting to the consumption tax in its tax mix at the expense of the income tax.
Numerous studies have been done to examine its impact on tax incidence and the overall
progressivity of the post-reform tax system. This paper turns its attention to the interaction
between components of fiscal policy. It asks the question: How does a change in tax mix
affect the effectiveness of government spending in stabilising the economy?

This paper shows that with the precondition of tax-revenue neutrality, the condition that
the larger the consumption tax component in the tax mix the more effective is the government
spending in stabilising the economy. This finding contributes to the discussion of changes in
tax mixes in the future and has some interesting implication for policy makers. With
monetary policy largely sidelined for inflation targeting and diminished influence of fiscal
policy under flexible exchange rate and capital mobility, a shift from income tax to
consumption tax may allow a government to regain some of its short- to medium-term
stabilising power though government spending provided the condition is satisfied. This adds
to the debate for a fundamental tax reform of replacing the income tax with a general
consumption tax. This paper also shows that the pair-wise trade-off ratio between the income
tax rate and the consumption tax rate varies with the structure of the economy; a point worth
noting by policy makers.
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The paper can be improved in at least two aspects. Firstly, the IS-LM model is a shortrun model, which presumed prices are fixed. In reality, the introduction of a general
consumption tax creates a one-off direct effect on prices paid by consumers, which means that
tax-revenue neutrality does not imply real-GDP neutrality. Secondly, the use of a model with
an external sector may be able to examine how much of an increase in effectiveness of
government spending via a shift in tax mix is offset by the elements of exchange rate system
and capital mobility.
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Notes

1.

With Australia joining the rank of countries with a general consumption tax, general
consumption taxes are now in place in 29 of the 3O OECD countries with the exception
of the USA, which only has state and local sales taxes.

2.

A glance at the OECD tax policy document for exemption in consumption tax, we find
that all OECD countries allow for some sort of exemption; see OECD (2001, pp.13-24).

3.

There are many issues covered in the economic literature such as revenue-maximising
consumption tax (Matthews and Lloyd-Williams, 2000), the impact of consumption tax
on capital investment (Davies et al., 2000), on savings and interest rates (Feldstein,
1995; Hall, 1997), trade balance (Auerbach, 1997), and on labour supply (McLure,
1987; Auerbach, 1997), to name a few.

4.

The IS-LM model, though primitive and short-run in nature, has implications that are
consistent with what we observe in the economy and is sufficient to throw light on the
issues explored in this paper. Because of the short run nature, the extension of the threesector model to one including the external sector only complicates the equations without
changing the qualitative nature of the results.

5.

Since the simplest interpretation of baseline consumption is the amount households
would consume if their disposable income in the current fiscal year were equal to zero,
we can interpret that it is likely to be that part of consumption related to necessity and is
most likely exempted from a general consumption tax. To mitigate the regressivity of
consumption tax, we argue that further exemption may be given to income-induced
consumption, for example, education in Australia. So, consumption exempted from
consumption tax is greater than autonomous consumption.

6.

Pitchford (1995) argues that the offset is not complete.

7.

The condition for the effectiveness of government spending is less complicated but no
more economic meaningful in its interpretation if the ∆v is only accompanied by a
revenue-neutral change in ∆t :
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dΦ
dv T

8.

⎧⎪ > ⎫⎪
⎨ = ⎬0
⎪⎩ < ⎪⎭

as

⎧⎪ > ⎫⎪

α vb c (1 − b) [α vt (1 − t ) + v] + 1 ⎨ = ⎬ 0
⎪⎩ < ⎪⎭

Matthews and Lloyd-Williams (2000) provided some empirical evidence about the
optimal value for consumption tax rate v.
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